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Abstract
The main goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of governance on economic growth
using a group of 188 countries. Although our main focus is on the 21 Middle Eastern and
North African (MENA) countries, our findings can be applied to the other countries as
well. We create a “composite governance index” (CGI) that summarizes the existing six
governance measurements in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), using the
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) method. The first principal component derived
from the WGIs explains as much as 81% of the variations in the original six WGI
measurements. We then use PPP adjusted constant per capita GDP data to find that per
capita GDP would rise by about 2% if the CGI increases by one unit. Using the Rule of
70, the marginal estimate further indicates a mere five-unit improvement in CGI would
double the country’s per capita GDP in seven years. Nonetheless, the effect of
improvement of governance cannot account for the higher than expected per capita GDP
in most of the oil rich MENA countries. In other words, the majority of the MENA
countries have achieved fragile levels of economic growth that does not depend on sound
governance.
I. Introduction
There is no doubt that improving the business climate is a major factor for attracting both
national and international investors to a country, which would ultimately be reflected in
increasing economic growth. Investors will drive away from a politically unstable,
bureaucratic, and highly corrupted economies with inefficient and nontransparent
government services. A government that is socially accountable in delivering services
and responsive to the needs of its citizens will ultimately create a democratic
environment leading to inclusive growth and human development.
The slow growth performances in many developing countries, especially Middle
East and North African (MENA) countries, have been disappointing over the last decade.
Since the second half of the 1980’s, growth and development studies have started to shed
the light on the importance of improving institutions of governance on economic growth.
The studies of Owens (1987) and Sen (1999) show that economic and political stability
has a statistical significant impact on economic growth and development.
Many scholars and researchers have confirmed the positive link of improved
quality of governance on economic growth. The study of Knack and Keefer (1997) shows
that both property rights and contract enforcement have positive impact on economic
growth. Similarly, Campos and Nugent (1999) prove a statistically significant positive
impact of governance on economic development. The work of Kaufmann, et al. (1999a
and 1999b) reaches the same conclusion about the importance of governance to economic
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development. Similar findings are reached in the work of Knack and Keefer (1995) and
Mauro (1995).
Much research work conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
United Nations, and the World Bank shows that good governance leads to economic
growth. For instance, Kaufman and Kraay (2002) evaluated the World Governance
Indicators over the period 1996 to 2002 and found a positive relationship between per
capita income and quality of governance.
One of the leading studies in the literature on institutions and their effect on
economic performance was written by Acemoglu, et al. (2000). The paper shows that
differences in economic performance among nations can be attributed to the difference in
institutions. Acemoglu, et al. found that different colonization strategies have led to
different types of institutions that remain today. Colonies with low mortality rates had
higher European settlements and accordingly stronger institutions were built which
ultimately explains differences between countries in terms of current performance.
Furthermore, the work of Acemoglu, et al. (2005b) concludes that differences between
countries in terms of income and economic development are explained by differences in
institutions. Within the same lines, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) show that differences
in economic prosperity among nations can be explained by differences in political
institutions. Their paper provides policy recommendations that suggest reforming
institutions would help in poverty alleviation. Additionally, the work of Chauvet and
Collier (2004) finds that developing countries with poor quality of governance will lead
to less economic growth. And within the same lines, the cross sectional of study by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) compares adjacent cities along the United States-Mexico
border. They reach the conclusion that political and economic institutions underlie
economic success and the degree of incentive structures and the state-market relationship
is the determinant factor of cities’ growth performance.
Given the previous background, the research on the link between governance and
economic growth for the MENA region is relatively very thin. The World Bank’s World
Governance Indicator project shows that the MENA region always ranks below the
average of the sample. This World Bank project seeks to measure the quality of
governance in a particular nation using six metrics: voice and accountability, political
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption. These metrics are measured both by a governance score that ranges from -2.5
to +2.5, and a percentile rank relative to nations worldwide.
The study of Leenders and Sfakianakis (2002) shows that the Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and
Libya is below the global median in terms of levels of public sector corruption. Similarly,
the World Bank (2003) study shows that the MENA countries perform lower than
countries with similar incomes and characteristics. In addition, Chêne (2008) shows that
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based on the World Bank Governance Indicators, MENA countries perform above
average in political stability, rule of law, and quality of administration, however, it
performs below average for the transparency, voice accountability, and control of
corruption.
Within the same lines, Han, X., Khan, H., and Zhuang, J. (2014) analyzes the
governance gap and its effect on economic growth. Among many other results, the study
shows that “Middle East and North African countries with a surplus in political stability,
government effectiveness, and corruption control are observed to grow faster than those
with a deficit in these indicators by as much as 2.5 percentage points annually.” The
study implies that governance matters to economic growth in the MENA region.
Furthermore, Mehanna, Yazbeck, and Sarieddine (2010) study the relationship
between governance and economic development in 23 MENA countries over the period
1996-2005. Their study compares different challenges facing the region including
education, fixed investment, presence of religious fractionalization, and governance. The
study shows that improving governance is the main challenge facing the MENA
countries. The study shows that voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and
control of corruption exert the strongest economic impact on economic development.
Additionally, Emara, N. and Jhonsa (2014) shows that despite the low
performance of most of MENA countries on almost all the six measures of World Bank
Governance Indicators, their estimated levels per capita of income are relatively higher
than the rest of the countries in the sample. This study concludes that most of these
countries have achieved relatively high but fragile standard of living that is not based on
sound governance.
According to the latest available World Governance Indicator data for the voice
and accountability metric, shows that 16 of the Middle East and North Africa region’s 21
largest countries by population were given a negative governance score and ranked in the
38th percentile or lower. For the political stability metric, 15 out of 21 were given a
negative score and ranked in the 36th percentile or lower. For the government
effectiveness metric, 12 out of 21 nations had negative scores, and 3 out of 21 ranked
below the 25th percentile. For regulatory quality, 15 out of 21 had negative scores, and 6
out of 21 again ranked below the 25th percentile. For rule of law, 11 out of 21 had
negative scores, and 4 out of 21 ranked below the 25th percentile. And for control of
corruption, negative scores were given to 13 out of 21 nations, with 4 out of 21 ranking
below the 25th percentile.
Despite the MENA governments’ effort to enhance the level of governance, the
World Bank’s Governance Indicators show no significant change across all indicators,
namely rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, voice and
accountability and regulatory quality for the MENA region over the period between 2007
and 2014. Of course looking at the MENA governance indicators, one can tell that the
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performance between these countries has been non-uniform. Countries such as Bahrain,
Cyprus, Israel, Oman, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates have performed relatively
better than the rest of the MENA countries. And with no doubt, given the recent political
instability in Syria, the data shows that Syria is the worst of the list of the MENA
countries in terms of all governance indicators. The data shows that Yemen and Iraq are
following Syria in terms of low levels of governance quality especially for the political
stability index.
The Open Budget Index of 2015 2 , which reflects governments’ social
accountability, shows that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, and Algeria have
recorded the lowest levels with a score of “scant or none (0-20)”. Furthermore, freedom
of the citizens to express their opinions in political matters and the freedom of the press
has been highly restricted in countries such as Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. As Pintak,
L. (2011) wrote about the Arab media’s poor standard of delivering services to its
citizens, “A free media is not necessarily a credible media.” So it’s not only a matter of
freedom, but it is also a matter of credibility.
In general, the extent to which citizens of the MENA region have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society have been generally very weak. The rule of law index is
relatively the worst for Iraq, Syria, and Yemen with an average of -1.29. Furthermore,
what makes matters worse for a countries with relatively strong legal framework such as
Egypt (score -0.60) is the problem of implementing such legislations. This means that the
problem of governance is not only about its existence but more importantly about the
mechanism through which it can be implemented to positively affect the society.
Additionally, countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen
suffer from relatively high levels of corruption with an average index of -1.02. Some of
these countries have taken steps to fight corruption but still more efforts need to be done.
For instance, Egypt has signed many international projects to fight corruption such as the
MENA-OECD Task Force on Anti-Bribery, OECD Good Governance for Development
in Arab Countries Initiative, the Arab Anti-Corruption and Integrity Network (ACINET),
and the UNDP-POGAR project to support the Ministry of Investment in the fight against
corruption (OECD, 2009). However, no significant change has happened and a lot still
needs to be done from the side of the government such as developing a nationwide anticorruption strategy.

2

The Open Budget Initiative monitors the availability of seven key budget documents: Pre-Budget
Statement, Executive’s Budget Proposal, Enacted Budget, In-Year Reports, Mid-Year Reports, Mid-Year
Review, Year-End Report, and Audit Report. The index also records the presence of Citizens’ Budgets.
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Against the above background this study seeks to provide a comprehensive index
of governance and estimate its impact on economic growth. Specifically, this study will
attempt to answer the following questions: How does economic growth change as the
comprehensive index of governance changes? Which component of governance is more
important in explaining variations of economic growth among different countries? How
these results are interpreted for the MENA region?
This study is organized as follows: Section II presents the regression model and
the methodology of the principal component analysis. Section III discusses the data set
used. Section IV analyzes the estimation results. Section V concludes this study. Section
VI includes the references. Finally, the appendix appears after Section VI.
II. Empirical Specification
(i) Regression Model
Following Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), our regression model is presented below:
pgdpi =  + *govi + ei

(1)

Where pgdp is the log per capita income, gov is the governance index, e
represents all the other factors not included in this parsimonious equation, and finally the
subscripts i represents the country. The estimate of  will provide information on the
marginal contribution of improving governance to the per capita gdp growth in the long
run.
We present the construction of composite governance index (CGI) using the
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method in this section. Statisticians and data
scientists have long adopted this data reduction PCA method in their work. However, it’s
not popular in economists’ empirical tool bag yet.
(ii) Principal Components Analysis
Given a data matrix X with p variables and n observations, we can write it as the
following:

 X 1,1
X
2 ,1
X =
 .

 X n ,1

.
.
.
.

. X 1,p 
. X 2 ,p 
; where i = 1…n, j = 1…p.
.
. 

. X n ,p 

(2)

Geometrically, the goal of the PCA is to project the data matrix X from p
dimensions to a smaller dimension k, where k << p, meanwhile keeping as much
information (i.e., variance maximization) as possible in this dimension-reduced data
131

Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies
Vol. 18, Issue No. 1, May 2016

matrix with the size n by k3. Specifically, the PCA method replaces a large number of
correlated variables (X1, … , Xp) with a smaller number of uncorrelated variables
(Principal Components; PC1, … , PCk).
Mathematically, the first principal component is a linear combination of X1 to Xp
observed variables that accounts for the largest variance among them:
PC1 = a1X1 + a2X2 + … + apXp

(3)

In equation (3) the vector of coefficient aj (j = 1…p) is termed loading vector and
is normalized to avoid inflating the variance of PC1. By the same token, the second
principal component (PC2) is another linear combination of X variables that accounts for
the largest variance among them, however, with a constraint; PC2 is required to be
orthogonal to PC1. Theoretically, we are able to track as many principal components as
the number of variables (p of them) in the data matrix X. But in practice, we search for a
much smaller number of principal components (PCs) that is able to capture as much as
information from the original set of X variables. We present the algorithm for deriving
PCs in the following section.
(ii) Algorithm to derive PCs
The algorithm to uncover PCs is based on the singular value decomposition (SVD)
method (I.T. Jolliffe, 2002). While there is no specific rule to select the number of PCs,
we use four criteria to determine the appropriate number of PCs; they are Kaiser-Harris’s
stopping rule (criteria), Cattell’s Scree test, Parallel analysis and Percent of cumulative
variance (see J. Brown, an internet source on this topic).
First, capital letter W is used to denote the variance-covariance matrix. Where W

XTX
, a p*p matrix and the
n 1
superscript “T” is the transpose operator. Since W is a symmetric matrix it can be
diagonalized as follows:
is related to data matrix X in the following form; W =

W = VVT

(4)

In equation (4), V is a matrix of eigenvectors and  is diagonal matrix with the
eigenvalues. The matrix V is essential in deriving PCs and it’s also termed Principal Axes.
Apply the SVD method to X and we can obtain the following:

Two excellent references that cover Principal Components Analysis method are “An Introduction to
Statistical Learning/ with Applications in R” & “R in Action”.
3
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X = UVT

(5)

As mentioned earlier, X is the data matrix with dimension n by p. U and V are
both orthogonal squared matrix with dimension n and p, respectively.  is diagonal with
diagonal entries that represent singular values.
There is a relationship between equation (4) and (5), that is:
W=

XTX
(UV T ) T (UV T )
V 2 V T
=
=
n 1
n 1
n 1

(6)

Comparing equation (4) to (6), it can be seen that the square of singular values
(from ) is actually the eigenvalues derived from the diagonalization of W (or XTX).
Denote the eigenvalues j (j = 1…p). The size of each  to the sum of all s
accounts for the proportion of variances in the original data matrix X that can be captured
by the corresponding principal component. If we rearrange  in a descending order from
1 to p, 1 and the corresponding eigenvector (or first principal component PC1)
accounts for the largest proportion of variances in X. In practice, correlation of matrix X
is applied before deriving PCs to avoid scaling problem. To this end, the principal
components are derived by post-multiplying data matrix X with the principal axes V.
Alternatively, PCs can also be derived using the following equation:
XV = UVTV = U

(7)

According to equation (7), principal components (PCs) can be obtained using
either one of the following outcome:
PCs  XV  U

(8)

III. Data
The cross-sectional data set is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators covering 188 countries for the years 2009 and 2013, with special focus on 21
MENA countries4. The reason to choose these two specific years for this study is to make
a comparison about the governance change before and after the Arab Spring that have
4

There are 22 MENA countries that include Algeria (DZA), Bahrain (BHR), Cyprus (CYP), Djibouti (DJI),
Egypt (EGY), Iran (IRN), Iraq (IRQ), Israel (ISR), Jordan (JOR), Kuwait (KWT), Lebanon (LBN), Libya
(LBY), Morocco (MAR), Oman (OMN), Qatar (QAT), Saudi Arabia (SAU), Syria (SYR), Tunisia (TUN),
Turkey (TUR), United Arab Emirates (ARE), West Bank and Gaza (WBG), and Yemen (YEM). Syria is
excluded in this study due to missing WGI data.
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started in Tunisia in 2010. For governance indicators, the Worldwide Governance
Indicators is used which have been published annually since 1998. The data of the
Worldwide Governance Indicators is compiled at the World Bank by Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). These indicators
are based on some 30 opinion and perception-based surveys of various governance
measures from investment consulting firms, non-government organizations, think tanks,
governments, and multilateral agencies classified into six dimensions including
government effectiveness, political stability, control of corruption and regulatory quality,
voice and accountability, and rule of law5. Data on GDP per capita in 2005 purchasing
power parity terms is sourced from the World Development Indicators.

IV. Empirical Outcomes & Findings
We first report the loadings of the six principal components and the corresponding
eigenvalues in Table 1. How many principal components are needed to capture the most
variances in X? Kaiser–Harris criterion suggests retaining components with eigenvalues
that are greater than one. In the Cattell Scree test, the eigenvalues s are plotted against
their component numbers p. If a big bend is revealed, the components above this bend
will be kept. In Figure 1, the blue line flattens out after the second component which is
where the bend appears. In the Parallel analysis, a series of s are obtained based on
simulation. If the eigenvalues obtained from X are greater than the average of simulated
s, the corresponding principal components are selected. The cross symbols “x” in Figure
1 represent all the six eigenvalues. The three criteria presented in Figure 1 all indicate the
first principal component should be selected; the cross symbol at the top left corner.
While we do not show the percent of cumulative variance graphically, a quick
computation using the eigenvalues presented at the bottom of Table 1, we can find that
the first PC explains about 81%6 of variances from the original data set, X.
We transform the original WGIs to a single composite governance index using the
following computational process:
PC1 = X*L1

(9)

5

The detailed definition of each indicator is provided in the appendix.
4.8735
6
= 0.8122 or 81.22%
4.8735  0.5509  0.3394  0.1414  0.0493  0.0455
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CGI =

PC1
*100
max( PC1 )

(10)

In equation (9), it shows that the first principal component is obtained by
multiplying both data matrix X and the first loading L1 (the first column in red ink in
Table 1). The Composite Governance Index (CGI) is the PC1 rescaled by dividing the
largest element in the PC1. The histogram of the CGI is reported in Figure 2. It’s a bit
skewed to the right. The median index is about -9.7. Our CGI indicates that Finland (FIN)
has the best governance index that equals 100 and Afghanistan (AFG) has the lowest
index that equals -88.85 among these 188 countries in our data. Based on the quartiles of
the CGI, we also report the ranking of governance of these 21 MENA countries in Table
2. Among these MENA countries, Cyprus has the best governance ranking and Iraq has
the lowest one.
Using equation (1), we run a regression of the log of per capita GDP on the CGI
and report the outcome in Table 3.1; the corresponding graphical outcome is presented in
Figure 3.1. In Table 3.1, due to small p-values, both the t-test and f-test support the
significance of slope estimate and validity of the model. The slope estimate indicates that
per capita GDP is going to grow by about 2% (0.0199) if the CGI increases by one unit.
The multiple or adjusted R2 says that 53% of variation in log of per capita GDP can be
explained by CGI.
We also conduct another regression that is only based on these 21 MENA
countries and report the outcome in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2. It can be seen that the
estimated slope is 0.01804 that is a bit lower than the estimated slope of 0.0199 from the
whole sample of 188 countries. While the estimated slopes are similar, we do notice that
the adjusted R2 drops significantly to 35.9%.
To this end, we make a comparison of the CGI and log of per capita GDP in both
year 2009 and 2013 and summarize our findings in Table 4. The CGI in 2013 is obtained
using the same loading we derived in 2009. While we feel disappointed that the
improvement in CGI doesn’t fully coincide with the economic growth in the MENA
countries, however, the low adjusted R2 we found earlier may indicate that there are more
factors that are involved in these countries’ economic growth in addition to the soundness
of governance. For example, Fig. 3.1 shows that the MENA countries that are way above
the regression line are mostly oil rich countries.
The results of Table 4 reveal interesting points. Over the period 2009 to 2013,
only five of the countries in the MENA countries, namely United Arab Emirates, Algeria,
Iraq, Israel, and West Bank and Gaza, have experienced an improvement in CGI that was
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accompanied by an enhancement in economic growth. Additionally, over the same period
only one country in the sample, namely Iran, has experience an improvement in its CGI
with no change in economic growth. Furthermore, only four countries namely Cyprus,
Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and Yemen have experienced deterioration in their CGI that was
also accompanied with lower economic growth over the same period. Finally, or more
importantly, over the same period about fifty percent of the MENA countries, namely
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and
Turkey have experienced deterioration in the CGI that was accompanied by an increase
in economic growth.

V. Conclusion
There are two main contributions in this paper. The first contribution is that we were able
to create a “composite governance index” (CGI) that summarizes the existing six
governance measurements; the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), using the
Principal Components Analysis (PCA). The first principal component derived from the
WGIs accounts for as much as 81% of the variations in the original six WGI
measurements, which indicates that it can be used as a strong indicator for evaluating
governments’ managerial ability and effectiveness. The second contribution is that we
were able to quantify the marginal contribution of improvement in governance on
economic performance using PPP adjusted constant per capita GDP data. We find that the
per capita GDP would rise by about 2% if the CGI increases by one unit. Using the Rule
of 70, the marginal estimate further indicates a mere five-unit improvement in CGI would
double a country’s per capita GDP in seven years.
Our results suggest that nine countries of the MENA region have shown a positive
correlation between governance and economic growth which includes those countries that
have experience deterioration accompanied by deterioration and those countries that have
experienced an enhancement accompanied by an enhancement in governance index and
in economic growth, respectively. The relatively low R2 of 35.9% confirms these results.
More specifically, the CGI explains only 35.9% of the variations in economic growth in
the MENA region. Our results go in line with the findings of Emara and Jhonsa (2014)
that the majority of the MENA countries have achieved fragile levels of economic growth
that does not depend on sound governance. Our next step in this research is to include
more control variables in the MENA regression model and we hope that, by doing this,
we can have a better qualitative prediction outcome on the link between governance and
growth in this region.
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Appendix
Table A Governance Indicators and Definitions
Measured by the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to
participate in selecting their government as well as freedom of
expression, association, and the press.
2- Political stability and Measured by the likelihood that a government will be destabilized by
absence of violence
unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism.
3- Government
Measured by the quality of public services, the capacity of civil
effectiveness
services and their independence from political pressure, and the
quality of policy formulation.
4- Regulatory quality
Measured by the ability of a government to provide sound policies
and regulations that enable and promote private sector development.
5- Rule of law
Measured by the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide
by the rules of society, including the quality of property rights, the
police and the courts, and the risk of crime.
6- Control of corruption Measured by the extent to which public power is exercised for private
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption as well as
elite “capture” of the state.
1- Voice and
accountability
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Figure 1 Principal Component Selection Criteria
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Figure 2 The Distribution of Composite Governance Index
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Figure 3.1 Linear Regression for All 188 Countries
Economic Growth vs CGI
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Figure 3.2 Linear Regression for 21 MENA Countries
Economic Growth vs CG
(MENA Country)
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Table 1 Loadings of Principal Components
WGI\Loadings of PCs

L1

L2

L3

L4

L5

L6

Control of Corruption (corr)

0.4303

-0.062

0.2557

-0.6295

0.5808

-0.1095

Government Effectiveness (ef)

0.431

-0.2729

0.2576

0.0263

-0.2887

0.7677

Political Stability (ps)

0.3377

0.8773

0.1642

0.2728

0.0836

0.0892

Regulatory Quality (rq)

0.415

-0.3868

0.0367

0.6964

0.337

-0.2799

Rule of Law (rl)

0.4424

-0.02

0.1273

-0.1736

-0.6771

-0.5469

Voice & Accountability (va)

0.3835

0.0454

-0.9076

-0.1167

0.0155

0.1152

Eigenvalues ()

4.8735

0.5509

0.3394

0.1414

0.0493

0.0455

Table 2 Ranking According to the Quartiles
Country

CGI

Rank

Country

CGI

Rank

ARE

28.10

2

KWT

13.56

2

BHR

12.67

2

LBN

-30.70

3

CYP

58.25

1

LBY

-45.35

4

DJI

-26.30

3

MAR

-13.30

3

DZA

-41.87

4

OMN

16.69

2

EGY

-19.85

3

QAT

43.52

1

IRN

-58.69

4

SAU

-13.49

3

IRQ

-71.26

4

TUN

-3.55

2

ISR

30.73

2

TUR

0.94

2

JOR

3.08

2

WBG

-34.46

4

YEM

-59.40

4

Notes: Rank = 1 if CGI > 35.4, Rank = 2 if -9.7 < CGI  35.4, Rank = 3 if -34.1 < CGI  -9.7,
Rank = 4 if CGI  -34.1
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Table 3.1 Impact of GCI on Economic Growth- All Countries
Dependent variable: Log Per Capita GDP
Estimation Method: Linear Regression Model
CGI
Intercept
Countries/Observations
F (1, 186) statistic = 210
R-Squared

0.020***
(0.001)
9.072***
(0.062)
188
p-value: < 2e-16
0.53

Notes: ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively. Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors.

Table 3.2 Impact of GCI on Economic Growth- MENA Countries
Dependent variable: Log Per Capita GDP
Estimation Method: Linear Regression Model
CGI
Intercept
Countries/Observations
F (1, 19) statistic = 12.2
R-Squared

0.018***
(0.001)
9.986***
(0.186)
21
p-value: 0.0024
0.36

Notes: ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively. Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors.
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Table 4: The Change in CGI and Growth Between the Years 2009 and 2013
Country
ARE
BHR
CYP
DJI
DZA
EGY
IRN
IRQ
ISR
JOR
KWT
LBN
LBY
MAR
OMN
QAT
SAU
TUN
TUR
WBG
YEM

CGI/09
28.10
12.67
58.25
-26.30
-41.87
-19.85
-58.69
-71.26
30.73
3.09
13.56
-30.70
-45.35
-13.30
16.69
43.52
-13.49
-3.55
0.94
-34.46
-59.40

CGI/13
32.26
-2.24
51.03
-36.58
-40.31
-43.65
-55.06
-67.17
33.98
-6.42
-3.35
-34.57
-75.04
-16.00
6.84
37.57
-13.64
-14.09
-1.84
-33.21
-64.84

Improve
4.16
-14.91
-7.22
-10.27
1.56
-23.80
3.63
4.09
3.26
-9.50
-16.91
-3.87
-29.69
-2.69
-9.84
-5.95
-0.14
-10.54
-2.78
1.25
-5.45

logY/09
11.02
10.61
10.44
7.86
9.44
9.19
9.69
9.40
10.26
9.33
11.29
9.66
10.24
8.74
10.77
11.70
10.68
9.23
9.65
8.34
8.38

Notes: CGI: composite governance index, Improve = CGI/13 – CGI/09
logY = natural log of per capita GDP, Growth: whether logY/13 > logY/09
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logY/13
11.02
10.64
10.31
7.98
9.49
9.22
9.66
9.63
10.34
9.34
11.22
9.71
9.88
8.84
10.57
11.82
10.80
9.28
9.83
8.41
8.21

Growth
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO

